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Abstract
The mathematical structure of realist quantum theories has given rise to
a debate about how our ordinary 3-dimensional space is related to the 3N-
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debate between 3N-Fundamentalists and 3D-Fundamentalists and evaluate it
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deeper understanding of the physical world, especially given the deeper topo-
logical explanation from the unordered configurations to the Symmetrization
Postulate, we have strong reasons in favor of 3D-Fundamentalism. I conclude
that our evidence favors the view that our fundamental physical space in a
quantum world is 3-dimensional rather than 3N-dimensional. I outline lines of
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Introduction
This is an essay about the metaphysics of quantum mechanics. In particular, it is
about the metaphysics of the quantum wave function and what it says about our
fundamental physical space.
To be sure, the discussions about the metaphysics within quantum mechanics
have come a long way. In the heyday of the Copenhagen Interpretation, Niels Bohr
and his followers trumpeted the instrumentalist reading of quantum mechanics
and the principles of complementarity, indeterminacy, measurement recipes, and
various other revisionary metaphysics. During the past three decades, largely due
to the influential work of J. S. Bell, the foundations of quantum mechanics have
been much clarified and freed from the Copenhagen hegemony.1 Currently, there
are physicists, mathematicians, and philosophers of physics working on solving
the measurement problem by proposing and analyzing various realist quantum
theories, such as Bohmian mechanics (BM), Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber theory (GRW),
and Everettian / Many-World Interpretation as well as trying to extend them to the
relativistic domains with particle creation and annihilation. However, with all the
conceptual and the mathematical developments in quantum mechanics (QM), its
central object—the wave function—remains mysterious.
1For good philosophical and historical analyses about this issue, see Bell (2004) for and Cushing
(1994).
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Recently, philosophers of physics and metaphysicians have focused on this diffi-
cult issue. Having understood several clear solutions to the measurement problem,
they can clearly formulate their questions about the wave function and their dis-
agreements about its nature. Roughly speaking, there are those who take the wave
function to represent some mind-dependent thing, such as our ignorance; there
are also people who take it to represent some mind-independent reality, such as a
physical object, a physical field, or a law of nature.
In this paper, I shall assume realism about the wave function—that is, what the
wave function represents is something real, objective, and physical. (Thus, it is not
purely epistemic or subjective).2 I shall conduct the discussion in non-relativistic
quantum mechanics, noting that the lessons we learn here may well apply to the
relativistic domain.3 To disentangle the debate from some unfortunately misleading
terminologies, I shall adopt the following convention.4 I use the quantum state to
refer to the physical object and reserve the definite description the wave function
for its mathematical representation, Ψ. In the position representation (which I
use throughout this paper), the domain of the wave function is all the ways that
fundamental particles can be arranged in space and the codomain is the complex
field C.5 (For convenience and simplicity, I leave out spin when discussing the
value of the wave function, noting that it can be added as additional degrees of
freedom (spinor values). Hence, Ψ ∈ L2(R3N,C).) The domain of the wave function
is often called the configuration space, and it is usually represented by R3N, whose
2I take it that there are good reasons to be a realist about the wave function in this sense. One
reason is its important role in the quantum dynamics. See Albert (1996) and Ney (2012). The recently
proven PBR theorem lends further support for this position. See the original PBR paper Pusey et al.
(2012) and Matthew Leifer’s excellent review article Leifer (2014).
3See Myrvold (2014) for an insightful discussion on the complications when we transfer the
discussion to the relativistic domain with particle creation and annihiliation. I take it that a clear
ontology of QFT will provide a natural arena for conducting a similar debate. Since a consistent QFT
is still an incomplete work-in-progress (although an effective quantum field theory is highly useful
and predictively accurate, and there have been proposals with clearer ontology such as Bell-type
QFT), I believe that there are many values in conducting the discussion as below—in the non-
relativistic QM—although we know that it is only an approximation to the final theory. The clarity
of the non-relativistic QM, if for no other purposes, makes many issues more transparent.
4I am indebted to Maudlin (2013) for the following distinctions.
5It is reasonable to wonder whether our definition applies to “flashy” GRW (GRWf) or mass-
density versions of GRW (GRWm). Although particles are not fundamental in these theories, the
definitions of GRWf and GRWm and the mathematical structures of these theories can be captured
by using wave functions defined on the particle-location configuration space. When interpreting
the physical theory (either according to the low-dimensional view or the high-dimensional view
described below), if we think of the wave function as representing something in addition to the
material ontology, we can regard the wave function space as having a structure that is independent
from the material ontology (and the configurations of material stuffs). We can call the domain of
the wave function “the configuration space,” but we do not need to understand it literally as the
space of configurations of the material ontology. How the material ontology is connected to the
wave function on “the configuration space” is explained by the definitions (such as the mass-density
function m(x, t) in GRWm) and the dynamical laws. Interpreted this way, many arguments that rely
on the configuration space of particle locations, including those in Sections 2 and 3, apply directly to
GRWf and GRWm. The exceptions are those arguments that rely on a justification or an explanation
of the configuration space. Therefore, our arguments in Section 4.2 apply most smoothly to theories
with a particle ontology such as Bohmian Mechanics and much less smoothly to GRW theories.
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dimension is 3 times N, where N is the total number of the fundamental particles in
the universe. (I shall represent the configuration space by R3N instead of E3N, noting
that the latter would be more physical than the former.) For the wave function of
a two-particle system in R3, the configuration space is R6. For the wave function
of our universe, whose total number of fundamental particles most likely exceeds
1080, the configuration space has at least as many dimensions as 1080.
Our key question is: given realism about the quantum state, how is the con-
figuration space related to our familiar 3-dimensional space? There are, roughly
speaking, two views corresponding to two ways to answer that question.6
3N-Fundamentalism R3N represents the fundamental physical space in quantum
mechanics. Our ordinary space, represented by R3, is less fundamental than
and stands in some grounding relations (such as emergence) to R3N.7
3D-Fundamentalism R3 represents the fundamental physical space in quantum
mechanics. The configuration space, represented by R3N, is less fundamental
than and stands in some grounding relations (such as mathematical construc-
tion) to R3.8
3N-Fundamentalism and 3D-Fundamentalism are the targets of the recent debates
under the name “The Metaphysics of the Wave Function,” “Wave Function Real-
ism versus Primitive Ontology,” and “Configuration Space Realism versus Local
Beables.” (To be sure, these debates often branch into discussions about other im-
portant issues, such as the nature of the quantum state: whether Ψ is a field, a law,
6I leave out the middle position between the two views, which says that both the 3N space and
the 3D space are fundamental. See Dorr (2009) for an exploration of that view.
7This view is often called Wave Function Realism, although we should remember that this is
unfortunately misleading terminology, for its opponents are also realists about the wave function.
Under my classification, 3N-Fundamentalists include David Albert, Barry Loewer, Alyssa Ney, Jill
North, and arguably, the time-slice of J. S. Bell that wrote “Quantum Mechanics for Cosmologists:”
“No one can understand this theory until he is willing to think of ψ as a real objective field rather than just a
‘probability amplitude’. Even though it propagates not in 3-space but in 3N-space.” (Bell (1987) p.128, his
emphasis.)
8This view is often taken to be a commitment to Primitive Ontology or Primary Ontology. Under
my classification, 3D-Fundamentalists include Bradley Monton, Detlef Dürr, Sheldon Goldstein,
Nino Zanghì, Roderich Tumulka, James Taylor, Ward Struvye, Valia Allori, Tim Maudlin, Michael
Esfeld, CianCarlo Ghirardi, and Angelo Bassi. Depending on how one thinks about the nature of
the wave function, there are three ways to flesh out 3D-Fundamentalism: (1) the wave function is a
physical object—a multi-field (more later); (2) the wave function is nomological or quasi-nomological;
(3) the wave function is a sui generis entity in its own category. No matter how one fleshes out the
view, the following discussion should be relevant to all, although (1) is the most natural viewpoint
to conduct the discussion. In a companion paper, I discuss the viability of (2) in connection to
David Lewis’s thesis of Humean supervenience. In a future paper, I plan to discuss the viability
of (3). In any case, defending (2) and (3) takes much more work and might in the end decrease
the plausibility of 3D-Fundamentalism. If the following discussion is right, since (1) is the most
plausible competitor with 3N-Fundamentalism with a high-dimensional field, it has been premature
for 3D-Fundamentalists to give up the defense of (1). Indeed, a careful examination of the pros and
the cons reveals its superiority over 3N-Fundamentalism (and its internal competitors (2) and (3)).
I shall not defend this claim here, and for this paper the reader does not need to take sides in this
internal debate among 3D-Fundamentalists.
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or a sui generis physical object.) In those debates, the most common considerations
include: (1) the dynamical structure of the quantum theory, and (2) the role of our
ordinary experiences. Usually, the opposing thinkers are taken to assign different
weights to these considerations.
For example, Jill North (2013) summarizes the disagreement as follows:
This brings us to a basic disagreement between wave function space and
ordinary space views: how much to emphasize the dynamics in figuring
out the fundamental nature of the world. Three-space views prioritize
our evidence from ordinary experience, claiming that the world appears
three-dimensional because it is fundamentally three-dimensional. Wave
function space views prioritize our inferences from the dynamics, claim-
ing that the world is fundamentally high-dimensional because the dy-
namical laws indicate that it is.9
However, as I shall argue, the common arguments based on (1) and (2) are either
unsound or incomplete. Completing the arguments, it seems to me, render the
overall considerations based on (1) and (2) roughly in favor of 3D-Fundamentalism.
However, there is another relevant consideration: (3) the deep explanations of
striking phenomena. Here, we find a more decisive argument in favor of 3D-
Fundamentalism as it leads to a deeper understanding of the mathematical sym-
metries in the wave function, known as the Symmetrization Postulate. Since
3D-Fundamentalism explains the Symmetrization Postulate much better than 3N-
Fundamentalism does, we have strong reasons to accept 3D-Fundamentalism.
I shall argue that the considerations (1), (2), and (3), taken together, favors 3D-
Fundamentalism over 3N-Fundamentalism. Here is the roadmap. In §1, I shall
argue, against the 3N-Fundamentalist, that the common argument from the dynam-
ical structure of quantum mechanics is unsound, and that after proper refinement
it no longer provides strong reason in favor of 3N-Fundamentalism. (As a bonus, I
will provide a direct answer to David Albert’s question to the primitive ontologists:
what is their criterion for something to be the fundamental physical space?) In §2,
I shall argue, against the typical 3D-Fundamentalist, that the common argument
from the Manifest Image can be resisted with spatial functionalism, but such a re-
sponse can be weakened by examining the details of the functionalist strategies.
This suggests that the argument from the Manifest Image, though no longer de-
cisive, still has some force. In §3, I shall explore which position leads to a better
understanding of the physical world and formulate a new argument based on the
recent mathematical results about the relationship between identical particles and
the symmetries in the wave function. The deeper topological explanation offered
by 3D-Fundamentalism strongly suggests that our fundamental physical space in a
quantum world is 3-dimensional rather than 3N-dimensional.
Finally, I shall offer future directions of research, point out how a 3N-Fundamentalist
might be able to respond to the last two considerations, and offer additional expla-
nations to restore or reverse the evidential balance between 3D-Fundamentalism
9North (2013), p. 196.
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and 3N-Fundamentalism.
As for the scope, this essay is more or less orthogonal to the debate between
3D and 4D views about time and persistence. However, the analysis in this essay
should be of interest to participants in those debates as well as to philosophers
working on the nature of the quantum state, the fundamentality / emergence of
space-time, and mathematical explanation in physics. As we shall see, our case
study also motivates a particular way of understanding the equivalence of theories
in terms of explanatory equivalence.
1 Evidence #1: The Dynamical Structure of Quantum Mechanics
At first glance, 3N-Fundamentalism looks like a highly surprising idea. What can
possibly motivate such a revisionary metaphysical thesis? The initial motivation was
the reality of the non-local and non-separable quantum state and the phenomena of
quantum entanglement—causal influences that are unweakened by arbitrary spatial
separation. Perhaps what we see in front of us (the interference patterns on the
screen during the double-slit experiment), the idea goes, are merely projections from
something like a “Platonic Heaven”—some higher-dimensional reality on which the
dynamics is perfectly local.
The initial motivation leads to our first piece of evidence in the investigation of
our fundamental physical space. Such evidence is based on the dynamical laws and
the dynamical objects in quantum mechanics. This seems to be the strongest evi-
dence in favor of 3N-Fundamentalism. In this section, I suggest that the dynamical
structure of the quantum theory, under closer examination, does not support the
view that the fundamental physical space in quantum mechanics is 3N-dimensional.
1.1 The Argument for 3N-Fundametalism
Here is one way to write down the argument for 3N-Fundamentalism based on
considerations of the dynamics.10
P1 We have (defeasible) reasons to infer a fundamental structure of the world that
matches the dynamical structure of our fundamental physical theory. [The
Dynamical Matching Principle]
P2 The dynamical structure of quantum mechanics (a candidate fundamental physi-
cal theory) includes the quantum state which is defined over a 3N-dimensional
configuration space. [The 3N-Structure of the Quantum State]
C1 We have (defeasible) reasons to infer that our fundamental physical space is
3N-dimensional.
10Strictly speaking, the following are based on considerations of both the kinematics and the
dynamics of the quantum theory. Nevertheless, the kinematical structure of the quantum wave
function plays an important role in determining the dynamics of the material ontology (Bohmian
particles, mass densities, etc) that move in the physical space.
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P1—the Dynamical Matching Principle—follows from a more general principle
of inference from physical theories to metaphysical theories:
The Matching Principle We have (defeasible) reasons to infer a fundamental struc-
ture of the world that matches the structure of our fundamental physical theory.
We should infer no more and no less fundamental structure of the world than
what is needed to support the structure of our fundamental physical theory.
The Matching Principle can be a highly useful guide for empirically-minded meta-
physicians.11 For example, we can use it to infer that the classical space-time is
Galilean rather than Newtonian. This inference agrees with our intuitions. More-
over, the inference is not based on controversial empiricist (perhaps verificationalist)
assumptions about eliminating unobservable or unverifiable structure.
1.2 The Assumptions in Premise 2
Suppose that something like the Matching Principle is true and the particular ap-
plication with the Dynamical Matching Principle is justified. Then the argument
would rest on P2. However, does the quantum state, represented by the wave
function Ψ, really have a 3N-dimensional structure? In other words, does the wave
function have to be defined over a high-dimensional configuration space?
Many people would answer positively. How else can we define the wave func-
tion, if not on a high-dimensional configuration space? For surely the wave function
has to take into account quantum systems with entangled subsystems that have non-
local influences on each other, which have to be represented by wave functions that
are non-separable. To take these into account, the usual reasoning goes, the wave
function of an N-particle system (say, our universe with 1080 particles), in general,
has to be defined as a field over on a 3N-dimensional space. Alyssa Ney (2012), for
example, endorses this line of reasoning:
...[Entangled] states can only be distinguished, and hence completely
characterized in a higher-than-3-dimensional configuration space. They
are states of something that can only be adequately characterized as
inhabiting this higher-dimensional space. This is the quantum wave-
function.12
North’s reasoning is similar:
In quantum mechanics, however, we must formulate the dynamics on a
high-dimensional space. This is because quantum mechanical systems
can be in entangled states, for which the wave function is nonsepa-
rable. Such a wave function cannot be broken down into individual
three-dimensional wave functions, corresponding to what we think of as
11This principle comes from North (2013) and North (forthcoming). See also Albert (1996) and
Albert (2015) for ideas in a similar spirit.
12Ney (2012), p. 556.
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particles in three-dimensional space. That would leave out information
about correlations among different parts of the system, correlations that
have experimentally observed effects. Only the entire wave function, de-
fined over the entire high-dimensional space, contains all the information
that factors into the future evolution of quantum mechanical systems.13
There are two assumptions that are worth making explicit in the above reasonings
(to be sure, North and Ney discuss them in their respective papers):
Ψ-as-a-Field The quantum state, represented by the wave function Ψ, is a field.
Field-Value-on-Points The space that a field “lives on” is the smallest space where
it assigns a value for each point in that space.
The two assumptions14 are explicit in David Albert’s argument in his important
paper “Elementary Quantum Metaphysics”:
The sorts of physical objects that wave functions are, on this way of
thinking, are (plainly) fields—which is to say that they are the sorts of
objects whose states one specifies by specifying the values of some set of
numbers at every point in the space where they live, the sorts of objects
whose states one specifies (in this case) by specifying the values of two
numbers (one of which is usually referred to as an amplitude, and the
other as a phase) at every point in the universe’s so-called configuration
space.15
However, as I shall argue, there are good reasons to reject both assumptions.
To deny Ψ-as-a-Field, one might instead propose that Ψ is not strictly speaking
a field (in any classical sense). For example, an electromagnetic field assigns a field
value to every point in the 3-dimensional space, and the values are meaningful
partly because multiplying the field by a constant will result in a different field and
different dynamics. (The gauge freedom in the electric potential therefore indicates
its relation to something more physical and more fundamental, such as the electric
field.16) However, the quantum wave function, multiplied by a global phase factor
(Ψ⇒ eiθΨ), remains physically the same. Insisting on Ψ-as-a-Field will lead one to
recognize physically indistinguishable features (that play no additional explanatory
role) as physically real and meaningful. It is desirable, therefore, that we do not
recognize Ψ as a fundamental field.17
However, even if one were to embrace the indistinguishable features brought
about by Ψ-as-a-Field, one can still deny Field-Value-on-Points. We usually think,
13North (2013), p. 190
14The qualification “smallest” is added to ensure that the principles render a unique space that a
field lives on.
15Albert (1996), p. 278
16Thanks to Michael Townsen Hicks for alerting me to the connection.
17However, it is possible to provide a gauge-free account of the wave function by giving a nomi-
nalistic and intrinsic account of quantum mechanics. In a future paper, I will provide the beginning
of such an account. But the next point holds regardless of the success of that program.
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as Albert describes, that the fundamental physical space is the fundamental space
that the dynamical object “lives on.” In particular, the fundamental space that a
field lives on is one in which we specify the state of the field at a time by specifying
the values at each point. This is indeed the case for the electromagnetic field. But
why think that this is an essential feature for a physical field?
Suppose that a fundamental field is mathematically represented by a function
from one space to another space. Such a function can be as general as one likes. A
special case, of course, is the electromagnetic field that assigns values to each point
in R3. But another one can be a quantum multi-field that assigns values to every
N-tuple of points in R3. That is, the function takes N arguments from R3. If we
think of the electromagnetic field as assigning properties to each point in R3, we
can think of the quantum multi-field as assigning properties to each plurality of N
points in R3 (N-plurality). The multi-field defined over N-pluralities of points in
R3 is, unsurprisingly, equivalent to the quantum wave function defined over each
point in R3N. 18
However, this approach has a disadvantage. On this conception of the multi-
field, we lose Albert’s very clear criterion for something to be the fundamental
physical space (based on the space that the fundamental field “lives on”). Indeed,
Albert asks,19 having given up his criterion, what would be an alternative conception
of the fundamental physical space that the 3D-Fundamentalists can give?
No one, as far as I know, has provided an alternative criterion for something
to be the fundamental physical space. But would it be terrible if there were none?
Some people would not worry, for the following reason. When we work on the
metaphysics of physical theories, we have in mind complete physical theories—
theories that specify their fundamental physical spaces; that is, for each theory, we
do not need to infer its fundamental space from the other parts of the theory. For
each complete theory, the fundamental space is given. Our task is to decide which
one (among the complete theories) is the best theory, by considering their theoret-
ical virtues and vices (especially their super-empirical virtues such as simplicity,
parsimony, explanatory depth, and so on). Albert’s question is not an urgent one,
because it is about a different feature of theories: how we arrive at them in the
first place. We could wonder whether we have inferred in the right way when we
say that the fundamental space of the theory is 3-dimensional. But we could also
just ask which theory is more plausible: the quantum theory defined on R3 or the
quantum theory defined on R3N.
However, we might construe Albert’s question in a different way, as asking
about a distinctive theoretical virtue, namely, internal coherence. In contrast to the
previous construal, this perspective would make Albert’s worry highly relevant to
the interpretive projects in the metaphysics of quantum mechanics. As I think of
it, internal coherence is distinct from logical consistency. A metaphysical / physical
18This approach of taking the wave function as a “multi-field” is explained in Forrest (1988) Ch.
6 and Belot (2012). I have heard that for many working mathematical physicists in the Bohmian
tradition, this has always been how they think about the wavefunction.
19Albert raised this question during his talk “On Primitive Ontology” at the 2014 Black Forest
Summer School in Philosophy of Physics.
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theory can be logically consistent without being internally coherent, in the sense
that it might contain theoretical parts that are in serious tension (though no logical
incompatibility) with each other. What the tension is can be precisified according
to the types of the theory. For example, a theory with a field-like entity defined
not on individual points but on non-trivial regions in the fundamental space has
theoretical parts that are in tension. Hence, one way for a theory to lack internal
coherence is for it to fail Albert’s criterion of Field-Value-on-Points.
Construed in that way, Field-Value-on-Points is a precisification of the theoret-
ical virtue of internal coherence. However, I shall argue that Albert’s argument
against 3D-Fundamentalism will not work even if internal coherence is a theoretical
virtue, for there is another equally valid way to precisify internal coherence.
Let us consider the following proposal for a first pass:
Field-Value-on-Pluralities The space that a field “lives on” is the smallest space
where it assigns values for pluralities of points in that space.
The modified criterion no longer requires the field to take on values at each point
in the space. But this seems to lead to another disastrous consequence for the
3D-Fundamentalist who holds the multi-field view, for the smallest space where it
assigns values for a plurality of points is not R3 but R1 (a linear subspace of R3)
where 3N fundamental particles move around (in a 1-dimensional space).20 Should
the 3D-Fundamentalist, based on the above criterion, accept R1 as the fundamental
physical space?
That initial worry dissolves itself if we take the particles to be indistinguishable
and physically identical, and we take the configuration space to be an unordered
configuration space (we will return to this proposal in §3). If the fundamental
physical space is R1, then two particles cannot pass through each other (see dia-
gram below). For two particles to pass through each other (which we would like to
make possible given the degrees of freedom of the particles in the 3D space and the
complexity of our world), there must be a moment in time where they occupy the
same point, which means that the wave function will be undefined at that moment.
(Recall that we represent an unordered configuration as a set instead of an ordered
tuple, and that the wave function is defined as functions from sets of N points in
R3 to complex numbers. At the instant where the two particles occupy the same
point (as the following diagram in R1 shows), the configuration will lose at least one
point, dropping down to a configuration of 3N-1 points. The wave function would
therefore be undefined.) However, things would be different as soon as we go to
a bigger space, say, R2. A particle can “pass through” another by missing it by a
small distance (such as particle 2* in the second diagram below) or going around
it, perhaps in a non-straight line, with arbitrarily small positive distance ε (such as
particle 2).21 Thus, the bigger space R2 provides more “expressive power” than R1.
20Thanks to David Albert for pointing out this worry.
21Thanks to Sheldon Goldstein and Nino Zanghì for pointing this out to me.
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Why not, then, take R2 instead of R3 as our fundamental physical space, since
it is also a linear subspace of R3? There are two reasons. First, we do not know
whether the total number of apparent particles in 3D space is even, which is required
if the fundamental dynamics is given by 3N/2 many particles in R2. However, we
do know (as the reader can easily verify) that the number of fundamental particles
times the dimensions of the fundamental space is a multiple of 3. It seems plausible
that, at least in the quantum theory, the fundamental physical space should remain
neutral about whether there are 2k or 2k − 1 particles. Second, even more than the
dynamics of 3N particles in R1, the dynamics of 3N/2 many particles, especially the
Hamiltonian function, (even if we assume N is even) is unlikely to be natural.22 It is
appropriate to add a neutrality constraint and a naturality constraint to the previous
criterion of the fundamental physical space:
Field-Value-on-Pluralities* The space that a field “lives on” is the smallest and most
natural space that is neutral to the parity of the total number of fundamental
particles and that the field assigns values for pluralities of points in that space.
If we regard Albert’s question as tracking the theoretical virtue of what I call “inter-
nal coherence,” then I take Field-Value-on-Pluralities* as an equally attractive way
of precisifying internal coherence. Given this precisification, 3D-Fundamentalism
wins, as R3 satisfies this criterion and is the space where the quantum multi-field
lives on. Without offering strong reasons to favor his precisification, Albert’s argu-
ment falls short of delivering the conclusion.
In this section, I have examined and improved the Argument against 3D-
Fundamentalism and still found its key premise unjustified. Therefore, our first
piece of evidence from the dynamical structure of quantum mechanics underdeter-
mines our choice between 3N-Fundamentalism and 3D-Fundamentalism.
22There may be many other reasons why the 3-dimensional space is special. In §3.2, we consider
the case of identical particles, for which spaces with fewer than 3 dimensions would allow fractional
statistics that correspond to anyons, in addition to fermions and bosons.
11
2 Evidence #2: Our Ordinary Perceptual Experiences
In this debate, many people have pointed out the obvious—our Manifest Image—
the tables, chairs, and experimental devices in front of us. How can these ap-
parently 3-dimensional objects exist if reality is vastly high-dimensional? If the
high-dimensional quantum mechanics could not explain the apparent reality of
pointer readings in 3 dimensions, from which we come to be justified in believing
in quantum mechanics, the theory would surely be self-undermining.
Hence it is common for 3D-Fundamentalists to use the second piece of evidence—
our ordinary perceptual experiences—to argue in favor of their view. In this sec-
tion, I suggest that although the evidence seems to support their view over the
alternative—3N-Fundamentalism, the evidential force depends crucially on the fate
of functionalism.
2.1 The Argument for 3D-Fundamentalism
Here is one way to write down the argument for 3D-Fundamentalism based on
considerations of the Manifest Image of 3-dimensional observers and pointers. (I
shall use relatively weak assumptions to generate a relatively strong argument.)
P3 If we cannot locate the Manifest Image of human observers and pointer read-
ings in an empirical (fundamental) scientific theory, then we have (defeasible)
reasons against that theory.
P4 We cannot locate the Manifest Image of human observers and pointer read-
ings in the quantum theory with 3N-Fundamentalism, which is an empirical
(fundamental) scientific theory.
C2 We have (defeasible) reasons against the quantum theory on 3N-Fundamentalism.
The first premise—P3—does not depend on an insistence of respecting the common
sense or the reality of the Manifest Image. Instead, it follows from a more general
principle:
Self-Undermining If we arrive at an empirical (fundamental) theory T based solely
on evidence E, and either we see that T entails that E is false without providing
a plausible error theory, or we see that T entails that our acquiring E is produced
by an unreliable process, or we see an ineliminable explanatory gap from T to
the truth of E (or some nearby propositions), then we have (defeasible) reasons
against T.
To see how P3 follows from Self-Undermining, we need to rewrite P3 in more
precise terms.
P3* If an empirical (fundamental) scientific theory contains an ineliminable ex-
planatory gap for the true claims (or some nearby propositions) about human
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observers’ pointer readings after experiments, then we have (defeasible) rea-
sons against that theory.
P3* seems highly plausible.23 The key idea is that our belief in a fundamental
scientific theory is not justified in a void, or properly basic, or merely coherent
with respect to the rest of our metaphysical beliefs. Rather, we are justified in
believing in it because we (or the scientific community as a whole) have acquired
sufficient empirical evidence through the pointer readings connected to particular
experimental set-ups. These pointer readings can be in principle reduced to the
positions of entities in a 3-dimensional space. And we acquire such crucial pieces
of evidence through perception and testimony. Each person in the society may not
acquire the evidence in a direct way. However, there has to be some direct perception
of the 3-dimensional recordings of the positions that justifies our beliefs in the
scientific theory. That is, we come to believe in the scientific theory on the basis of
our observations about the arrangement of macroscopic objects in the 3-dimensional
space. Now, if the scientific theory cannot explain the truth of such observations
of pointer readings, or if it turns out that we would be systematically wrong about
the arrangements of these macroscopic objects in the 3-dimensional space, then we
acquire an undermining defeater: the theory suggests that our evidence for the
theory is false. This is especially objectionable for scientific theories that attempt to
give a comprehensive explanation for the empirical world that includes the human
observers, pointers, and laboratory set-ups.
2.2 The Assumptions in Premise 4
If we accept P3*, then the success of the argument depends on the second premise—
P4. P4 is the claim that we cannot find the Manifest Image of human observers
and pointer readings in the quantum theory on 3N-Fundamentalism. In other
words, there is an ineliminable explanatory gap for the true claims (or some nearby
propositions) about human observers’ position readings of the experimental set-ups.
Many people sympathetic to 3D-Fundamentalism take this premise to be straight-
forward.24 However, 3N-Fundamentalists have offered a proposal about how to
close the explanatory gap. Their general strategy goes by the name of “functional-
ism.”25
In our context here, “functionalism” refers to a formulation of the sufficient
condition for what counts as emergent and real objects:
23This is similar to the demand for “empirical coherence” in Barrett (1999) and Healey (2002).
The principle, I take it, is weaker than the often cited principle in Maudlin (2007b) that the physical
theory makes contact with evidence via “local beables.” Huggett and Wüthrich (2013) discuss, in
light of the recent developments of quantum gravity and string theory, the complications of that
requirement.
24See, for example, Allori (2013) and Maudlin (2013).
25It is different from functionalism in philosophy of mind, as it is concerned not with minds
but macroscopic physical objects, but the two theories have interesting similarities that are worth
exploring further.
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Functionalism If we have a fundamental theory of the world in which we can
define a mapping from the fundamental degrees of freedom to Q1,Q2, ...Qn,
and Q1,Q2, ...Qn have the same counterfactual profile of what we take to be the
constituents of the Manifest Image, then Q1,Q2, ...Qn are real, emergent entities
from that fundamental theory and our discourse about the Manifest Image is
made true by the fundamental theory via the functionalist mapping.26
More specifically, we take the 3N-Fundamentalist to be adopting the following
sufficient condition:
Functionalism about pointers If we have a fundamental theory of the world in
which we can define a mapping from the fundamental degrees of freedom to
Q1,Q2, ...Qn, and Q1,Q2, ...Qn have the same counterfactual profile of what we
take to be the 3-dimensional pointers in the Manifest Image, then Q1,Q2, ...Qn
are real, emergent entities from that fundamental theory and our discourse
about pointer readings is made true by the fundamental theory via the func-
tionalist mapping.
Three questions arise. First, can we find such a mapping? Answer: yes, it is available
to the 3N-Fundamentalist. The most obvious solution would be to choose just the
three degrees of freedom associated with each apparent particle from which we
construct the configuration space. The 3-dimensional particles are not fundamental,
but we recognize that there is a mapping from the 3N-dimensional space to N
particles in the 3-dimensional space. Therefore, our discourse about the pointers
and human observers that are made out of particles in the 3-dimensional space
is grounded via the functionalist mapping from the fundamental picture (in the
Bohmian 3N picture: one Marvelous Point moving in a high-dimensional space).
Second, is the mapping unique? Answer: it depends. We can, for example, use
the dynamical structure to privilege one set of mappings. Albert (1996) takes this
strategy and suggests that there is a uniquely preferred mapping because of the
contingent structure of the Hamiltonian of the universe that governs the dynamics











V j,k([(x3 j−2 − x3k−2)2 + (x3 j−1 − x3k−1)2 + (x3 j − x3k)2])
The idea is that the fundamental degrees of freedom are contingently grouped into
triples in the Hamiltonian potential term, instantiating a relation just like the familiar
26Thanks to an anonymous referee, I realize that this definition of functionalism leaves open the
question how to understand the notion of “counterfactual profiles” in certain theories. Take GRWm
for example: when we evaluate a counterfactual situation by changing the mass densities within
a bounded spatial region R, it is not at all clear how we should change the mass densities outside
of R or how we should change the wave function to reflect the changes in the mass densities as
the mappings are many-to-one. There may be some ways to handle this worry (and we invite the
defenders of 3N-Fundamentalism to address this worry), but the referee is right that it raises another
sort of worry on the viability of the functionalist program.
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Pythagorean distance relation, which gives rise to the 3-dimensional Euclidean
metric. Each triple is what we take to be a particle in the 3-dimensional space. Even
in a classical world, the Pythagorean distance relation gives rise to a structure that
is invariant under rotation, translation, and reflection symmetries, and grounds our
claims about the 3-dimensional space. In a relativisitic world, the Minkowski metric,
according to many people, gives rise to a genuinely 4-dimensional spacetime:
d(a, b)2 = −(cδt)2 + (δx)2 + (δy)2 + (δz)2
Therefore, the reasoning goes, the mathematical structure in the Hamiltonian po-
tential term gives rise to an emergent, distinguished, and invariant structure of
3-dimensionality—R3—that grounds our discourse about pointer readings and hu-
man observers. Moreover, the Hamiltonian, in a unique way, puts the fundamental
degrees of freedom into Ω/3 triples.
Third, isn’t the sufficient condition too permissive? If what suffices to be emer-
gent and real is just to stand in a mathematical mapping relation to the fundamental
dynamical objects, then (as Tim Maudlin27 and John Hawthorne28 observe indepen-
dently) there will be many more emergent objects than we realize, a consequence
that is highly implausible. Under Functionalism, simply by defining a mathemat-
ical mapping from the location of every object in the world to three feet north of
that object, there will be emergent objects interacting with other emergent objects
unbeknown to all of us! Since the 3-feet-north mapping is completely arbitrary,
there will be infinitely many mappings, each of which will realize a different set of
emergent entities. As a consequence, just by defining trivial mappings like these,
we can create metaphysical monstrosities of an unimaginable scale.
The 3-feet-north objection is a special case of a general objection to structuralism
and functionalism: the mere existence of certain structure, counterfactual depen-
dence, or causal relations is sometimes insufficient ground for establishing the reality
of the emergent entities. In our context, the 3-feet-north objection suggests that the
functionalist criterion is insufficient, and hence the proposed mapping from the fun-
damental degrees of freedom in 3N-Fundamentalism does not explain the pointers
or observers in the 3-dimensional space.
I see two potential responses. First, the 3N-Fundamentalist can bite the bullet,
embrace the seemingly absurd consequence of the functionalist criterion, and in-
clude in her ontology infinitely many sets of emergent entities. To show that the
consequences are tolerable, she can give an argument that shows that all sets of
emergent entities are in fact equivalent in some way. One obvious argument makes
use of relationalism about space. If relationalism is true, then there is no container
(the substantial space) in addition to spatial relations among objects. Take any set
of emergent entities (for example, the emergent entities that are 3 feet north of ev-
erything in the world), the spatial relations instantiated among them are the same
spatial relations instantiated in any other set (for example, the emergent entities that
are 5 feet west of everything in the world). The sets of emergent entities related by
27Personal communication February 2015.
28See Hawthorne (2010), pp.147-152.
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such mappings are just different ways of describing the same relational world. Call
this The Relationalist Approach.
The Relationalist Approach, I think, is the most promising response on behalf
of the 3N-Fundamentalist. However, it faces a problem. Functionalism, if true,
seems to be a necessary truth. Relationalism, on the other hand, does not seem to
be a necessary truth. The mere possibility of the failure of relationalism implies
that there are possible worlds in which the functionalist criterion generates too
many emergent entities. Since those possible worlds are not too remote, our modal
intuitions seem robust enough to account for them. The metaphysical monstrosity
seems highly implausible. So it seems that Functionalism is still false. At this point,
the 3N-Fundamentalist can reply that Functionalism is in fact a contingent truth
that holds only among relational worlds. It would take future work to show why
this is true or how it follows from other commitments of Functionalism.
Instead of suggesting that the thesis is contingent, the 3N-Fundamentalist can
reply that there are ways of restricting the functionalist criterion such that it does not
lead to the absurd consequences. One way to restrict the criterion is to say that the
functionalist mapping has to be an identity mapping.29 The reason that projection
mappings from R3N to R3 are insufficient is that a projection map composed with a
spatial translation is another a projection map; since the spatial translamtion can be
completely arbitrary, there will be an infinite number of projection mappings that
are equally good. However, if we let the functionalist relation to be the identity
mapping, we can eliminate this problem. Applied to our case, the relation takes
the triplets of degrees of freedom in the configuration space as identical with the 3-
dimensional particles. For example, take the Bohmian “marvelous point” in the 3N-
dimensional configuration space: its coordinates x1, y1, z1 just are a 3-dimensional
particle. Identity is a strict relation that is not preserved by arbitrary mappings.
Neither does the strategy rely on relationalism about space. Call this The Identity
Approach.
However, not only does it have difficulty extending to GRW theories, the Identity
Approach gets rid of the metaphysical monstrosities at the expense of eliminating the
Manifest Image altogether. To see this, let us borrow some idioms from the ground-
ing literature. The grounding relation, as commonly conceived,30 is an umbrella
term for several kinds of metaphysical dependence relations. One widely-accepted
feature of grounding is that if a set of facts or entities, Σ, grounds another set of
facts or entities Γ, then it is not the case that Γ grounds Σ. Such an asymmetry is a
defining feature of the grounding relation. If the particles and their electromagnetic
interactions ground the existence of a table, it is not the case that the table’s exis-
tence grounds the particles and their electromagnetic interactions. Let us examine
the suggestion that the functionalist mapping has to be an identity mapping. As
I understand it, the functionalist mapping is a metaphysical dependence relation
that falls under the umbrella of the grounding relation. Hence, the mapping has to
be asymmetric. However, the identity relation is symmetric. We have arrived at a
29Barry Loewer suggests this in personal communication, but he does not necessarily endorse it.
30For example, see Rosen (2010).
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contradiction. Therefore, one of the assumptions has to go. Since the functionalist
mapping is supposed to metaphysically explain the emergence of 3-dimensional
objects such as pointers and observers, it is best understood as a metaphysical ex-
planation relation that is asymmetric. So it seems to me that the 3N-Fundamentalist
should reject the suggestion that the functionalist criterion only allows identity
mappings.
There is another way to restrict the functionalist criterion. Instead of counting
mathematical mappings of any sort, a 3N-Fundamentalist can restrict to mappings
between different spaces. For this smaller class of mathematical mappings, the
3-feet-north counterexamples do not arise, for the dynamics and causal behaviors
on different levels are likely to be quite different. Call this The Different Space
Approach. In addition to being obviously ad hoc and unprincipled, the Different
Space Approach does not block composite mappings. The composite mappings first
from R3N to R3 then from R3 to itself are not ruled out by the restriction and still
generate the same counterexamples.
The above discussions of different approaches of functionalism—the Relational-
ist Approach, the Identity Approach, and the Different Space Approach—suggest
that the current functionalist criterion is too permissive and leads to disastrous re-
sults for the 3N-Fundamentalists. Thus, we are right to doubt whether there can be
any principled way to close the apparent explanatory gap in 3N-Fundamentalism.
However, Functionalism, just like Structuralism, is still being developed, and its
application here is novel and potentially promising. Given the recent work on the
emergence of space-time and structural realism, there may well be future work that
suggests better proposals than the ones we have considered. Anecdotal evidence
suggests that many philosophers are not deterred by the above counterexamples
and are still searching for some version of Functionalism that closes the explanatory
gap in a principled way.
So far our discussions have focused on the two main considerations in the lit-
erature: the dynamical structure of the quantum theory and the successful expla-
nation of the Manifest Image. If I am right, then the common arguments based on
these considerations are either unsound or in need of refinement. After locating
the crucial premises, I show how they can be resisted on either side. While the
3D-Fundamentalist can respond line by line by giving an alternative criterion of
fundamental physical space, the 3N-Fundamentalist cannot provide a satisfactory
functionalist criterion. So far, the considerations based on the dynamical structure
and the Manifest Image are roughly in favor of 3D-Fundamentalism. However,
anecdotal evidence suggests that this has not persuaded many 3N-Fundamentalists
to switch sides, as they are often inclined to bite the bullet and swallow the costs of
counter-intuitiveness.
I take this to suggest that the most common philosophical arguments do not
fully settle the debate between the two views. It looks like we have reached a
stalemate. However, I suggest that we have not. In the next section, by looking into
which view leads to a deeper understanding of the quantum world, I argue that we
can find a new class of powerful arguments that favor 3D-Fundamentalism over
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3N-Fundamentalism.
3 Evidence #3: Mathematical Symmetries in the Wave Function
Having seen that the common arguments from the dynamical structure and ordinary
experiences do not fully settle the debate between 3D-Fundamentalism and 3N-
Fundamentalism, I suggest we look at the debate from a different angle. As we
are examining scientifically motivated metaphysical positions, we would like to see
which one leads to a better or deeper understanding of the scientific phenomena. In
this section, I offer an argument for 3D-Fundamentalism on the basis that it provides
a deeper mathematical explanation of certain symmetries in the quantum theory.
Since I do not take this to be the final word on the issue, I offer this as a first step
toward an open research program to explore various mathematical explanations31
in the quantum theories.
3.1 Another Argument for 3D-Fundamentalism
P5 If a fundamental theory T explains S while T’ does not, and S should be explained
rather than postulated (other things being equal), then we have (defeasible)
reasons to infer that T is more likely than its alternative to be the fundamental
theory.
P6 3D-Fundamentalism explains the Symmetrization Postulate but 3N-Fundamentalism
does not.
P7 The Symmetrization Postulate should be explained rather than postulated.
C3 We have (defeasible) reasons to infer that 3D-Fundamentalism is more likely to
be the fundamental theory than 3N-Fundamentalism.
The first premise—P5—seems to me highly plausible. When we compare two
fundamental theories, we measure them not just by empirical adequacy and internal
coherence but also by explanatory depth. Say that a theory T provides a deeper
explanation for X than T’ does if T explains X from its axioms and T’ postulates X
as an axiom.
For example, if a fundamental physical theory T says that the Symmetrization
Postulate is true (there are two groups of fundamental particles and one group has
symmetric wave functions and the other group has anti-symmetric wave functions),
if (other things being equal) we would like to understand why that is the case, and
if we find out that its alternative S provides an explanation for that fact, then we
have defeasible reasons to favor S over T.
31Here I do not take sides whether such mathematical explanations are non-causal explanations.
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3.2 Justifying Premise 6
If we accept P5, then the success of the argument depends on P6 and P7. It is
important to note that P6 is not the unique premise that delivers the conclusion.
There probably are many mathematical explanations that favor 3D-Fundamentalism
over 3N-Fundamentalism, including Lorentz symmetry.32 (Indeed, I take it to be
an open research question whether there are good mathematical explanations that
support 3N-Fundamentalism. To be sure, what counts as a good explanation and
what counts as something that should be explained can be controversial.)
In any case, P6 focuses on a particular mathematical explanation that arises from
the mathematical study of identical particles and the nature of their configuration
space.33 34
Roughly speaking, identical particles share the same intrinsic physical proper-
ties, that is, the same qualitative properties recognized by the physical theory. For
example, all electrons can be regarded as identical (which in this context means
physically indistinguishable) since they have the same charge, mass, and spin. (To be
sure, their different positions in space cannot correspond to their intrinsic properties,
for if nothing else they would not be able to move.) Suppose we take the ordinary
configuration space R3N for N electrons. Then the configuration space is ordered:
(x1, y1, z1,x2, y2, z2, ...,xn, yn, zn)
Each point in the configuration space is an ordered 3N-tuple and can be read as the
x, y, z coordinates of electron 1, those of electron 2, those of electron 3, and all the
way up to the x, y, z coordinates of electron N. The numeral labels provide names
(and thus distinguishability) to the electrons. Therefore, the configuration in which
electron 1 and electron 2 are exchanged will be a different configuration and hence
will be represented by a different point in the configuration space.
However, the distinct points resulting from permutations of the electrons do
not give rise to any real physical differences recognized by the physical laws. If
we were to have the simplest ontology supporting the laws of quantum mechanics
(or indeed any atomistic theory, including the Democritean atomism and classical
mechanics), we should have a physical space representing all and only the real
physical differences, excluding differences resulting from permutations of identical
particles. Therefore, we can introduce the notion of an unordered configuration
space for N particles in 3-dimensional space as:
NR3 ∶= {S ⊂ R3∣ cardinality(S) = N}
32For example, see Allori (2013), pp. 72-73.
33In writing this section, I am grateful for many extensive discussions with Sheldon Goldstein and
Roderich Tumulka about their papers on the Symmetrization Postulate.
34I do not include this explanation in the “inferences from the dynamics” category, for it concerns
the mathematical construction of the theory.
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So a point in this configuration space would be:
{(x1, y1, z1), (x2, y2, z2), ..., (xn, yn, zn)}
Notice that the points are not 3N-tuples but sets of N elements, which are unordered
(given the extensionality axiom of ZF set theory). In fact, it is a set of tuples, but the
ordering corresponds to the coordinatization of the 3-dimensional space, which can
be ultimately eliminated by using E3 instead of R3.
Even in classical mechanics, we can use the unordered configuration space NR3
(or the relevant unordered phase space) instead of the ordered configuration space
R3N. Such a choice would not lead to any physical differences, as the two spaces
share the same local properties. They differ, however, in their global topological
properties, which become essential in quantum mechanics. In particular, NR3 (like
the circle S1) is topologically non-trivial in that it is not simply-connected, as not
every closed loop is contractible to a point, while R3N (like the real line R1) is simply
connected—a much more trivial topology. As we will explain below, their global
topological differences allow us to derive the deep and useful principle known as
the Symmetrization Postulate.
Conventionally, a quantum theory with wave functions defined over an ordered
configuration space needs to postulate an additional requirement—the Symmetriza-
tion Postulate—to rule out certain types of particles. It says that there are only two
kinds of particles: symmetric wave functions for bosons and anti-symmetric wave
functions for fermions. The “symmetry” and “anti-symmetry” refer to the behavior
of the wave functions under position exchange. Stated for particles in 3-dimensions:
Symmetrization Postulate: There are only two kinds of wave functions:
(Bosons) ψB(xσ(1), ...,xσ(N)) = ψB(x1, ...,xN),
(Fermions) ψF(xσ(1), ...,xσ(N)) = (−1)σψF(x1, ...,xN),
where σ is a permutation of {1,2, ...,N} in the permutation group SN, (−1)σ
denotes the sign of σ, xi ∈ R3 for i = 1,2, ...,N.
This is an extremely deep and highly useful principle. To have a more intuitive grasp
of it, we can recall the more familiar Pauli Exclusion Principle, which says that no two
electrons can occupy the same quantum state (usually characterized by quantum
numbers). For one direction of implication, consider two electrons (fermions) with
a wave function that is totally anti-symmetric under position exchange. It follows
that they cannot occupy the same position, that is:
∀x1,x2 ∈ R3, ψ(x1,x2) = −ψ(x2,x1)Ô⇒ ∀x ∈ R3, ψ(x,x) = 0
Surprisingly, the Symmetrization Postulate, being deep and useful, emerges as
a result of a beautiful mathematical analysis about the topological properties of the
unordered configuration space.35 Here we sketch only an outline of the derivation;
35For the classic papers in the mathematical physics literature, see Dowker (1972) and Leinaas and
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we refer interested readers to the Appendix for more technical details.
Let us take Bohmian Mechanics (BM) as the background theory, in which there
really are particles with precise trajectories, guided by a universal wave function.
(Let us use scalar-valued wave functions to avoid further technicalities. We will later
return to the question whether such an explanation is available on the Copenhagen
intepretation and GRW theories.) In BM, the universal wave function evolves
according to the Schrödinger equation, and particles move according to the universal
wave function and the guidance equation. The configuration space for N identical
particles in R3 is NR3, not R3N. However, they are intimately related. In fact, R3N is
what is called the “universal covering space” of NR3. There is a natural projection
mapping from R3N to NR3 that forgets the ordering of particles. Since the physical
configuration lies in NR3, the velocity field needs to be defined there, whereas the
wave function can still very well be defined on R3N, as we can project its velocity
field from R3N to the NR3. However, not every velocity field can be so projected.
To ensure that it can , we impose a natural “periodicity condition” on the wave
function on R3N:
∀q̂ ∈ R3N, σ ∈ SN, ψ(σq̂) = γσψ(q̂).
Since the fundamental group SN is a finite group, the topological factor γσ has to
be a group character (see Unitarity Theorem in Appendix). But SN has only two
characters: (1) the trivial character γσ = 1 and (2) the alternating character γσ =
sign(σ) = 1 or − 1 depending on whether σ ∈ SN is an even or an odd permutation.
The former corresponds to the symmetric wave functions of bosons and the latter to
the anti-symmetric wave functions of fermions. Since any other topological factors
are banned, we have ruled out other types of particles such as anyons. This result
is equivalent to the Symmetrization Postulate.
We have seen that given some natural assumptions about identical particles inR3,
the unordered configuration space NR3, and a globally well-defined velocity field,
we have very easily arrived at an explanation for the Symmetrization Postulate.
With Bohmian Mechanics in the background, the derivation is well-motivated at
each step. The rigorous mathematical work is done by Bohmian researchers in
two beautiful papers Dürr et al. (2006) and Dürr et al. (2007), of which the above
discussion is a simplification (of the simple case of scalar-valued wave functions).
(For technical details, please see the Appendix.)
The above explanation might still work in the context of standard textbook
quantum mechanics and the Copenhagen interpretation, according to which we
should not take it seriously that particles are things that have precise locations and
velocities simultaneously. Usually, in this context, we are told to act as if there are
particles and to construct various mathematical objects from the degrees of freedom
of the particles (such as the use of the configuration space). From a foundational
point of view, it is not clear why the configuration space should be useful in such
a theory. But if we play the usual game of acting as if there are particles, perhaps
Myrheim (1977). But Dürr et al. (2006) and Dürr et al. (2007) carry out the explanation much more
thoroughly and successfully in Bohmian mechanics. The outline in the next paragraph is a summary
of their more technical derivation in the case of scalar wave functions.
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we can also act as if they are really identical, as if their states are given by a point in
the unordered configuration space, and as if the above assumptions in the Bohmian
theory are also justified in this theory. Indeed, this seems to be the implicit attitude
taken in two pioneer studies—Dowker (1972) and Leinaas and Myrheim (1977)—
about quantum mechanics for identical particles and unordered configuration space.
What about other solutions to the measurement problem, such as GRWm (a
spontaneous collapse theory with a mass-density ontology)? Since its fundamental
material ontology consists in a mass-density field (not particles) in the 3-dimensional
space, it is unclear why we should use the configuration space of particle locations.
However, usually the wave function and the mass-density field are defined with the
help of the configuration space. 36 Nevertheless, it seems inconsistent with the spirit
of GRWm to act as if there are fundamental particles or as if the above-mentioned
Bohmian assumptions hold in the theory. In particular, there do not seem to be any
compelling reasons to consider NR3, a crucial piece in the above derivation, unlike in
the case of BM. Hence, we do not think that the previous argument applies smoothly
to the case of GRW theories or the Many-Worlds interpretation with a mass-density
ontology.37 Unlike the arguments in the previous sections, the argument we offer
here does depend on the specific interpretation of quantum mechanics, namely
Bohmian Mechanics. Whether we can make similar topological arguments in the
context of GRW and MWI would require thinking more deeply about the structures
of their state spaces. (This stands in contrast with the situation in §1 and §2, where
the arguments do not require a justification of the structure of the configuration
space.)
Returning to the construction of the unordered configuration space NR3, we
observe that it stands in a special relation to R3, namely, mathematical construction.
In this sense, a quantum system of N-identical-particles in R3 naturally give rise
to NR3, which in turn naturally give rise to the mathematical explanation of the
Symmetrization Postulate.
However, this explanation is not available for the quantum theory on 3N-
Fundamentalism. Although in the above explanation we use R3N in defining the
wave function (as it is the universal covering space of NR3), simply starting with
R3N gets us nowhere near to the characters of the permutation group. Starting with
a wave function and a “marvelous point” (the only fundamental particle) on R3N,
we do not have any motivation to consider NR3, the natural configuration space for
N particles in R3. Consequently, we cannot make use of its explanatory power in
the derivation of the Symmetrization Postulate. (That is because, given a particle
moving in R3N, we do not have any motivation to use the covering-space construc-
36For example, when defining the mass-density function at a time t, we start with a ∣Ψt∣2-
distribution in the particle-location configuration space R3N, and obtain the value by using the
marginal distribution weighted by the particle masses and summing over all particle degrees of
freedom:






d3x1...d3xNδ3(xi − x)∣Ψt(x1, ...,xN)∣2
37We thank an anonymous referee for helping us make this clear.
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tion to derive the topological factors of the wave function, and we do not have an
explanation for the Symmetrization Postulate.)
Therefore, we have justified P6—the second premise in the argument.
3.3 Deep versus Shallow Explanations
What about P7, the idea that the Symmetrization Postulate should be explained
rather than postulated?38 Here are some compelling reasons to endorse it:
• Its form is very different from the other laws of QM such as the Schrödinger
equation. It is a direct restriction on the possible quantum states of systems
with indistinguishable particles.
• It has high explanatory power. The Symmetrization Postulate explains Pauli’s
Exclusion Principle and the Periodic Table. It also explains why there are
exactly two kinds of particles in QM.
• In the words of Pauli, at the occasion of his 1946 Nobel Lecture, as quoted in
the epigraph: “Already in my original paper I stressed the circumstance that
I was unable to give a logical reason for the exclusion principle or to deduce
it from more general assumptions. I had always the feeling, and I still have it
today, that this is a deficiency.”39
Granted, one might still deny P7 at this point. But it seems to me (and to many
working physicists) that P7 is much more likely to be true than its denial. The above
reasons suggest that an explanation of P7 would point us to something deep in
the physical nature of the world. It is true that in an ultimately axiomatic theory
of physics, the explanatory relations can be reversed (just as logical theories can
be axiomatized in different ways corresponding to different explanatory relations).
However, I think it is reasonable to believe that the final quantum theory ought not
to postulate the Symmetrization Postulate as fundamental but rather as something
that follows from simpler axioms.
3.4 What about NR3-Fundamentalism?
In this essay, I have assumed that the 3N-Fundamentalist is really aR3N-Fundamentalist.
She can of course modify her thesis and believe instead in a fundamentally multiply-
38P7 shows the difference between my argument here and Maudlin’s argument in Maudlin (2013)
pp.140-42. The difference in our arguments lies in our use of different explananda. Maudlin suggests
that for, say, an 8-particle universe, the natural configuration space is 8R3 instead of R24, but that
cries out for an explanation: why is this particular space 8R3 the fundamental space instead of some
other space with a different factorization of 24 (such as 4R6)? This is an insightful argument, but I
do not think it would convince many defenders of 3N-Fundamentalism, as on their view the funda-
mental space does not need further explanation. In contrast, our argument is quite different: we are
not asking for an explanation of the fundamental space, but for an explanation of the Symmetriza-
tion Postulate, something that everyone agrees to be a deep and puzzling symmetry in quantum
mechanics. Thus, I include Pauli’s quote as it beautifully conveys the deep puzzlement.
39Pauli et al. (1994), p.171.
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connected physical space, NR3. The 3D-Fundamentalist can respond by charging
her opponent’s move as ad hoc or unnatural, since NR3 is “clearly” about N identical
particles in R3. But similar criticisms have not prevented anyone from taking R3N





There is, however, another argument against the 3N-Fundamentalist’s maneuver
that is even less controversial. My main goal in this paper has been to evaluate the
evidential support for 3D-Fundamentalism and 3N-Fundamentalism. Given 3N-
Fundamentalism, the fundamental physical space has two main possibilities: (1) a
simply-connected space R3N and (2) a multiply-connected space that is a quotient
space of R3N by the permutation group of k objects where k divides 3N. I believe that
(1) is intrinsically more likely than (2). But suppose we grant them equal probability.
Still, (2) comes in many further possibilities, and NR3 is intrinsically as likely as any
other quotient space. So we should assign equal probability to each possibility in
(2). Given a large N, NR3 will receive a very small probability compared to that
of R3N.40 In the table above, the ratio of the two areas for R3N and NR3 roughly
corresponds to the relative confidence that we have in them.
Given 3D-Fundamentalism, there is only one main candidate for the fundamental
physical space–R3 and two main candidates for the configuration space–R3N and
NR3. Although an ontology of identical particles is simpler than that of non-identical
particles, for the sake of the argument, we can give these two possibilities equal
weight. Hence, in the table above, the two candidates divide the area roughly in
half.
If we take as a datum that the Symmetrization Postulate is true, assume that NR3
is the correct route to explain it, and we allow explanatory strength to come in de-
grees, then overall (considering all versions) 3D-Fundamentalism explains it better
than 3N-Fundamentalism does. So although both 3D-Fundamentalism and 3N-
Fundamentalism contain versions of them that explain the Symmetrization Postu-
late, 3D-Fundamentalism is better supported by the successful explanation. There-
fore, the evidence “disconfirms” 3N-Fundamentalism over 3D-Fundamentalism.
(That is, if we assume a standard way of thinking about update and Bayesian con-
firmation theory.41) In fact, we can reformulate the original argument by replacing
P6 with a weaker premise:
40Thanks to Gordon Belot for helpful discussions here.
41In a different context (the problem of evil) at the Rutgers Religious Epistemology Workshop in
May 2014, Lara Buchak discussed a different approach to rational updating—updating by condition-
als. It is up to the defender of 3N-Fundamentalism to develop and apply that approach here. Even if
that were to succeed, however, I think it would be a significant concession that 3N-Fundametnalism




Manifest Image + -/0
Explanatory Depth + -/0
Table 1: Summary of pros and cons; where “+” means “strongly in favor,” “-” means
“strongly against,” and “0” means “roughly neutral.”
P6* 3D-Fundamentalism explains the Symmetrization Postulate significantly better
than 3N-Fundamentalism.
Therefore, even if NR3-Fundamentalism is an option for the 3N-Fundamentalism,
her view is still not well supported by the explanation. The above argument fleshes
out our intuition that the 3N-Fundamentalist maneuver is ad hoc or unnatural.
However, this should reflect only our current state of knowledge and should not
be taken as the final word on the issue. Indeed, there are several ways that future
research can go:
1. We discover more mathematical explanations only available to 3D-Fundamentalism,
which gives us more reason to favor 3D-Fundamentalism over 3N-Fundamentalism.
2. We discover some mathematical explanations only available to 3N-Fundamentalism,
which restores or reverses the evidential balance between 3D-Fundamentalism
and 3N-Fundamentalism.
3. We discover that there exists a mathematical explanation of the Symmetriza-
tion Postulate from other resources in 3N-Fundamentalism that is independent
from the topological considerations as discussed above, which restores the ev-
idential balance between 3D-Fundamentalism and 3N-Fundamentalism.
4 Conclusion
Based on the above evaluation of the three kinds of evidence (see Table 1), I conclude
that, given our current knowledge, it is more likely that the fundamental phys-
ical space in quantum mechanics is 3-dimensional rather than 3N-dimensional.
However, as noted above, there are future directions of research where the 3N-
Fundamentalists can restore or even reverse the evidential balance.
Our debate here is related to the discussions about theoretical equivalence; we
observe the following:
1. 3N-Fundamentalism and 3D-Fundamentalism are highly equivalent in theo-
retical structure–the mathematics used is exactly the same;
2. The debate between 3N-Fundamentalists and 3D-Fundamentalists almost reaches
a stalemate and hence might be considered as non-substantive;
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3. An important new piece of evidence lies not in the inferences from the dy-
namics or ordinary experiences but in the mathematical symmetries in the
wave function. What breaks the tie is the fact that 3N-Fundamentalism and
3D-Fundamentalism are explanatorily inequivalent, and the latter explains the
Symmetrization Postulate better than the former.
Therefore, the discussion about the wave function provides another useful case
for the ongoing debate about theoretical equivalence and structure. The connection
should prove fruitful for future research.42
5 Appendix: A Topological Explanation of the Symmetrization
Postulate
Here, we provide the technical details of our argument in §3.2 by following the
mathematical derivations in Dürr et al. (2006) and Dürr et al. (2007) regarding the
case of scalar-valued wave functions. We omit the case of vector-valued wave
functions as it is mathematically more complicated but conceptually similar to the
scalar case.
Our goal is to arrive at all possible Bohmian dynamics for N identical particles
moving in R3, guided by a scalar wave function. We want to show that, given some
natural assumptions, there are only two possible dynamics, corresponding to the
symmetric wave functions for bosons and the anti-symmetric wave functions for
fermions. We will use the covering-space construction and examine the permissible
topological factors.43
The natural configuration space for N identical particles in R3 is:
NR3 ∶= {S ⊂ R3∣ cardinality(S) = N}
Since it is a multiply-connected topological space, we follow the usual covering-
space construction to define the dynamics on its universal covering space and project
it down to NR3. Its universal covering space is, unsurprisingly, the simply-connected
R3N. Let Cov(R3N,N R3) denote the covering group of the base space NR3 and its
universal covering space R3N. Given a map γ ∶ Cov(R3N,N R3) → C, we define a
wave function on this space: ψ ∶ R3N → C with the following periodicity condition
associated with γ:
∀q̂ ∈ R3N,∀σ ∈ Cov(R3N,N R3), ψ(σq̂) = γσψ(q̂).
First, we show that if the wave function does not identically vanish (which
42Thanks to David Schroeren for discussing this last point with me.
43This argument, of course, is not intended as a mathematical demonstration, as we appeal to
considerations of naturalness and simplicity. But these assumptions are relatively weak, and they
are guided by strong intuitions of the practicing mathematical physicists. Even better, in our case of
NR3, we can prove the Unitarity Theorem—that the topological factor in the periodicity condition
has to be a character of the fundamental group.
26
is a natural assumption), the topological factor γ is a representation. Given any
σ1, σ1 ∈ Cov(R3N,N R3):
γσ1σ2ψ(q̂) = ψ(σ1σ2q̂) = γσ1ψ(σ2q̂) = γσ1γσ2ψ(q̂).
Hence, γσ1σ2 = γσ1γσ2 .Therefore, γ is a structure-preserving map and a representation
of the covering group.
It is a well-known fact that the covering group is canonically isomorphic to the
fundamental groupπ1(Q, q), where Q is the base space. In our case, the fundamental
group π1(NR3, q) is SN, the group of permutations of N objects. It has only two
characters: (1) the trivial character γσ = 1 and (2) the alternating character γσ =
sign(σ) = 1 or − 1 depending on whether σ ∈ SN is an even or an odd permutation.
The former corresponds to the symmetric wave functions of bosons and the latter
to the anti-symmetric wave functions of fermions. If we can justify the use of the
periodicity condition and a ban on any other topological factors in the periodicity
condition, we would be able to rule out other types of particles such as anyons. This
result would be equivalent to the Symmetrization Postulate.
The periodicity condition is the most natural condition to require if we want a
projectable velocity field given by the wave function on the covering space. The pe-
riodicity condition implies that ∇ψ(σq̂) = γσσ∗∇ψ(q̂), where σ∗ is the push-forward





then it is related to other levels of the covering space:
v̂ψ(σq̂) = σ∗v̂ψ(q̂).
This makes v̂ projectable to a well-defined velocity field on the base space NR3:
vψ(q) = π∗v̂ψ(q̂),
where q̂ is an arbitrary point in R3N that projects down to q via the projection map
π.
Moreover, the periodicity condition is natural because it is preserved by the
Schrödinger evolution. Therefore, given an initial point q0 in the unordered config-
uration space NR3, we can choose an arbitrary point q̂0 in the ordered configuration
space R3N that projects to q0 via π, evolve q̂0 by the usual guidance equation in R3N
until time t, and get the final point qt = π(q̂t). The final point qt ∈N R3 is independent
of the choice of the initial q̂0 ∈ R3N.
We explain why it is crucial for the topological factor to be not only a represen-
tation of the fundamental group but also unitary, as it is required to ensure that the
probability distribution is equivariant. Given the periodicity condition, we have
∣ψ(σq̂)∣2 = ∣γσ∣2∣ψ(q̂)∣2.
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To make ∣ψ(q̂)∣2 projectable to a function on NR3, we require that ∀σ ∈ SN, ∣γσ∣2 = 1.
This is equivalent to γ being a character (a unitary representation) for the funda-
mental group. Given the Schrödinger equation on R3N and the projection of ∣ψ(q̂)∣2
to ∣ψ∣2(q), we have:
∂∣ψt∣2(q)
∂t
= −∇ ⋅ (∣ψt∣2(q)vψt(q)).
Compare this with the transport equation for a probability density ρ on NR3:
∂ρt(q)
∂t
= −∇ ⋅ (ρt(q)vψt(q)).
Therefore, if ρt0(q) = ∣ψt0 ∣2(q) at the initial time t0, then ρt(q) = ∣ψt∣2(q) at all later
times. We have arrived at equivariance.
The above argument works for the general case of multiply-connected spaces as
well as the particular case of NR3. In our case of NR3, we can prove the following
simple theorem that the topological factor γ must be a unitary representation, i.e. a
group character.
Unitarity Theorem Let σ ∈ Cov(R3N,N R3), γ ∶ Cov(R3N,N R3) → C. If γσ ≠ 0 and
γσ1σ2 = γσ1γσ2 , ∀σ1, σ2 ∈ Cov(R3N,N R3), then ∣γσ∣ = 1.
Proof The fundamental group of NR3 is the permutation group SN, which has N!
elements. We obtain that γId = 1, because γσ = γ(σ∗Id) = γσγId and γσ ≠ 0. It is a
general fact that in a finite group with k elements, every element σ satisfies σk = Id.
Therefore, rewriting γσ = Reiθ, we have 1e0i = 1 = γId = γσk = (γσ)k = Rkeikθ. So we
have: ∣γσ∣ = 1, which makes γσ a unitary representation of the covering group, which
is a character of the fundamental group. ◻
Therefore, the periodicity condition associated with the topological factor:
∀q̂ ∈ R3N,∀σ ∈ SN, ψ(σq̂) = γσψ(q̂)
is a highly natural and simple condition that guarantees well-defined dynamics on
NR3, and the topological factors are the characters of the fundamental group.44 In
the case of NR3, the fundamental group is the permutation group of N objects: SN.
Recall that it has only two characters: (1) the trivial character γσ = 1 and (2) the
alternating character γσ = sign(σ) = 1 or −1 depending on whether σ ∈ SN is an even
or an odd permutation. This leads to two possible dynamics corresponding to the
symmetric and the anti-symmetric wave functions (and no more):
(Bosons) ψB(xσ(1), ...,xσ(N)) = ψB(x1, ...,xN),
(Fermions) ψF(xσ(1), ...,xσ(N)) = (−1)σψF(x1, ...,xN),
44In our particular case of NR3, we have the Unitarity Theorem to explain why the topological
factors have to be characters of the fundamental group. In the general case, even without such a
theorem there are still many good reasons why we should restrict the topological factors to the group
characters. See Dürr et al. (2007) §9 “The Character Quantization Principle.”
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where σ is a permutation of {1,2, ...,N} in the permutation group SN, (−1)σ denotes
the sign of σ, xi ∈ R3 for i = 1,2, ...,N. Therefore, we have arrived at the statement of
the Symmetrization Postulate for the 3-dimensional physical space. Interestingly,
the same argument would predict that there are more possibilities than fermions
and bosons if we go to a smaller space. For N identical particles in a 2-dimensional
space, there is the additional possibility of fractional statistics, corresponding to
anyons.45
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